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RELIANCE ON ADVICE OF COUNSEL
INACCURATE advice by attorneys may lead their clients to undertake conduct
which normally would be subject to criminal penalties or civil liability.' In
some circumstances proof that acts or omissions occurred in good faith reliance
on the mistaken advice of counsel can be used as a defense to such liability. The
utility of this defense is limited. Reliance may negative the existence of criminal
intent, bad faith, or negligence; when proof of one of these elements is essential
to liability, reliance on counsel will be a good defense. Thus, reliance may be
interposed in defense to a charge of larceny or embezzlement, 2 to an assessment
of penalties for failure to file federal tax returns,3 or to a stockholder derivative
action alleging negligence of the corporation's directors. 4 But reliance can never
be a justification for an act which is unlawful or wrongful in itself. Thus, the
defense cannot be used successfully in those situations where an act or omission
is the only element necessary for the imposition of the penalty or liability. For
example, proof of reliance will be of no avail with respect to a public welfare
offense, 5 a claim for compensatory damages for trespass or conversion,6 or a
motion to punish for contempt of court.7 Even in some of these cases, however,
1. Errors committed by attorneys are actionable only if they are the result of negli-
gence, incompetence, or fraud. In practice, few errors are found to fall within this class. In
addition to the rather vague standards of competence required, errors may often be caused
by an inaccurate or incomplete rendition of the facts by the client. And attorneys, generally,
are hesitant to bring suit against or testify against other members of the profession. See
generally Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 233 (1953); Gardner, Attorneys' Malpractice, 6 Cizv.-MAR. L. Rv. 264
(1957) ; Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. Rxv. 755 (1959);
Comment, Malpractice at the Bar, 26 TENN. L. REv. 525 (1959).
2. State v. Patterson, 66 Kan. 447, 71 Pac. 860 (1903) ; People v. Long, 50 Mich. 249,
15 N.W. 105 (1883) (dictum) ; Buchanan v. State, 5 So. 617 (Miss. 1889) ; State v. Hunt,
25 R.I. 75, 54 Atl. 937 (1903) (dictum).
3. E. M. Green, 11 B.T.A. 278 (1928) (dictum). In many cases reliance on the advice
of a licensed accountant has the same effect as reliance on the opinion of an attorney. E.g.,
Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Haywood Lum-
ber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950); Hatfried, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947).
4. Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Pool v. Pool, 22 So. 2d 131 (La. App.
1945) ; Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (dictum) ; Spering's Appeal, 71
Pa. 11 (1872).
5. These offenses, which do not require mens rea, include illegal sales of intoxicating
liquor, sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, sales of misbranded articles, criminal
nuisances, and violations of antinarcotic acts, traffic regulations, motor-vehicle laws, and
general police regulations. See PERKINS, CRImINAL LAW eh. 7, § 5, at 701-03 (1957) ; Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLum. L. REv. 55, 62 (1933).
6. United States v. St. Anthony R.R., 192 U.S. 524 (1904) ; United States v. Homestake
Mining Co., 117 Fed. 481 (8th Cir. 1902) ; Abbott v. 76 Land & Water Co., 103 Cal. 607,
37 Pac, 527 (1894).
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reliance may be taken into consideration by the court as a factor in mitigation of
penalties or damages.8
Reliance on the advice of counsel tends to be regarded as a unique kind of
defense, perhaps because courts view the law as an especially esoteric field of
knowledge in which laymen cannot be held responsible for exercising their own
judgment in the face of expert opinion. But other kinds of expert advice might
also be used as defenses. Reliance on the advice of an accountant has been re-
garded as a defense in some cases involving tax fraud.9 A few state statutes
relieve directors of liability for declaring illegal dividends if they have relied on
statements by corporate financial officers. 10 And in one case, a defendant who
had been sued for malicious prosecution for having erroneously initiated a civil
commitment proceeding was allowed to introduce, as proof of his good faith, evi-
dence of advice from a family physician that the plaintiff was insane. 1 This
development seems reasonable. Reliance on counsel is but a means of establishing
"good faith" or "due care." If a problem requires the use of professional advice
of a nonlegal nature, obtaining and relying on such advice should also satisfy
these requirements. This Comment will focus on the elements necessary to con-
stitute the defense of reliance on the advice of counsel, and will examine those
areas of substantive law where that defense is frequently raised. The factors
discussed, however, may prove applicable when reliance on other expert advice
is offered as a defense.
ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE
Accurate Reliance
The first prerequisite to successful invocation of the defense of advice of coun-
sel is that the advisee must follow the advice of his attorney without variation.'
2
7. In re La Varre, 48 F.2d 216 (S.D. Ga. 1930) ; Queen & Co. v. Green, 170 Fed. 611
(E.D. Pa. 1909) ; Folsom v. State, 216 Ark. 31, 224 S.W.2d 44 (1949). Contra, Furrer v.
Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 109 Neb. 1, 189 N.W. 295 (1922); Rumney v. Donovan, 28
Mont. 69, 72 Pac. 305 (1903).
8. Reliance is explicitly considered as a mitigating factor in contempt of court cases.
In re La Varre, mtpra note 17; Coffin v. Burstein, 68 App. Div. 22, 74 N.Y. Supp. 274 (1902).
9. See note 3 mipra.
10. See note 55 infra.
11. Griswold v. Griswold, 143 Cal. 617, 620-21, 77 Pac. 672, 673 (1904):
He was the family physician. He was supposed to... know more about the mental
condition of plaintiff than any attorney at law could have known. If defendant had
not consulted the family physician, but had gone to an attorney at law, it would cer-
tainly seem that he had much less ground for the prosecution than by pursuing the
course he did.
Cf. Richter v. Neilson, 11 Cal. App. 2d 503, 54 P2d 54 (1936).
12. See, e.g., People v. Long, 50 Mich. 249, 251, 15 N.W. 105 (1883):
Respondent claimed to have acted in good faith ... under the advice of counsel
Unfortunately for him he did not follow it. His counsel did not advise him to take
the buggy secretly, but to take it, rendering what was due .... If one relies upon legal
counsel for protection against punishment for unlawful acts, he must show that he
followed it.
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Courts, however, have never defined what is meant by a "variation," nor have
they indicated its consequences. Several alternative definitions can be postulated.
An absolute standard would render the defense unavailable upon a showing of
variation in the slightest degree. A better view, however, would be that a failure
to follow advice constitutes a "variation" only when the reasonably prudent
man, in making the deviation, would have realized that he was not following
his lawyer's advice. When the layman of average competence and intelligence
would not have been aware of the difference, he should not lose whatever pro-
tection reliance may afford. This reasoning is equally applicable to the situation
where the client's insubstantial variation has made his actions unlawful. Here
again there would seem to be no negligence on the part of the advisee if he recog-
nized the existence of a problem requiring for its solution the attention of an
attorney, retained competent counsel, and attempted to comply with his attor-
ney's advice with all the care and diligence of a reasonable man. By the same
token, where the client has committed a substantial variation he should forfeit
the defense of reliance entirely, regardless of whether the consequence is to in-
crease or even decrease the liability. Even a good faith belief that the modifica-
tion will have no legal effect should not preserve the defense. It does not seem
consonant with reasonable care consciously to deviate from expert advice re-
garding a problem outside the realm of personal competency.
In Good Faith
To establish a defense of reliance, the advice given by the attorney must be
ostensibly correct. If the advice is patently erroneous the advisee cannot rely on
it in good faith. This restriction applies regardless of whether the advisee did,
in fact, recognize the error, for if the prudent layman of average intelligence
would have comprehended the error, the reliance was not reasonably justified.3
An example of implied bad faith by reason of patent error can be f6und in James
v. West.14 In that case the creditors of an estate asserted that the administrator
13. E.g., In re Perel, 51 F.2d 506 (S.D. Tex. 1931) ; In re Holbert, 48 Cal. 627 (1874);
Carty v. Toro, 223 Ind. 1, 57 N.E.2d 434 (1944). In some cases the courts have abandoned
the "reasonable man" standard and inquired into the intelligence of the defendant in an effort
at determining whether he could have reasonably accepted the advice. See Willett v. Tichen-
or, 220 S.W. 709 (Mo. App. 1920), where the defendant was convicted of contempt of court.
"Were he [the defendant] illiterate or uneducated, I would be inclined to say that the advice
of his counsel would furnish a complete excuse, but he is not." Id. at 710 (quoting from trial
court opinion). Inability to detect erroneous tax advice has also been considered. See Davis
v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Orient Inv. & Fin. Co. v. Commissioner,
166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; cf. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Where the advice rendered is flagrantly inaccurate, the courts sometimes take the posi-
tion that the attorney either was not in possession of all the information, or was in collusion
with the defendant. See In re Perel, 51 F.2d 506 (S.D. Tex. 1931) ; In re La Varre, 48 F.2d
216 (S.D. Ga. 1930) ; Smith v. King, 62 Conn. 515, 26 At. 1059 (1893).
See also United States v. Anthony, 24 Fed. Cas. 829 (No. 14459) (Cir. Ct. N.D.N.Y.
1873) (advice of counsel that law was unconstitutional ruled invalid defense).
14. 67 Ohio St. 28,65 N.E. 156 (1902).
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had acted improperly in making a distribution to the beneficiaries before pay-
ment of all claims against the estate. The administrator sought to rebut the alle-
gation by showing that the distribution was made upon the advice of his attorney.
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected his contention, on the ground that reliance
on such advice was not reasonable when the statute clearly provided that all
debts be first paid and distribution be made only of the remainder. Similarly, an
individual cannot have a default judgment expunged merely because his attor-
ney advised him that he need not appear in an action, or answer a complaint. 15
It is held to be contrary to common sense completely to ignore a summons to de-
fend an action.
Good faith also comprehends the requirement of full disclosure of all relevant
information, because an attorney cannot be expected to render an accurate
opinion of law without such information. Nondisclosure of information which
the client thinks is relevant would be a clear indication of bad faith.10 Even if
the client honestly thinks that the information is not relevant, nondisclosure may
taint the defense. Relevancy is a question of law, peculiarly within the compe-
tence of the attorney. Hence, the layman should not assume the discretion to
make the decision, and should bear the risk of loss if he does so. If the advisee
is not aware of the information, but it is relevant, he will bear the risk of loss
only if a reasonable investigation would have revealed it.17
Competent Counsel
The courts have imposed a dual criterion with respect to the competence
of the attorney on whose advice the defendant claims reliance. The counselor
must be qualified to practice law by being a duly licensed member of the bar;
in addition, he must be a proficient practitioner. One court has held that the
attorney relied on need not be admitted to practice in the jurisdiction in which
15. Carty v. Toro, 223 Ind. 1, 57 N.E.2d 434 (1944).
16. In re Merritt, 28 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1928) ; Smith v. Hensley, 107 Colo. 180, 109
P.2d 909 (1941); Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 Atl. 708
(1924) ; Mills v. Vollmer-Clearwater Co., 126 Wash. 73, 217 Pac. 3 (1923) ; Nelson v. J. H.
Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N.E. 180 (1909). Distortion of facts, careless or intentional,
works the same result. Kitchen v. Rosenfeld, 44 R.I. 399, 117 Atl. 537 (1922). In re Holbert,
48 Cal. 627 (1874) the defense of reliance was ruled improper when the defendant neither
concealed nor distorted information, but he was aware that his attorney had not made suffi-
cient inquiry into the facts.
For an extreme application of this rule, see Levinson v. United States, 263 Fed. 257 (3d
Cir. 1920) (statement to counsel that transfer of money was a loan when jury later found
it to be a payment for capital stock).
Some courts have held that a defendant cannot offer evidence of reliance without first
establishing that counsel was aware of all the relevant facts. State v. Oppenheimer, 73 Kan.
104, 84 Pac. 588 (1906) ; Louisville & N.R.R. v. Smith, 141 Ala. 335, 37 So. 490 (1904). But
see Rainey v. Kemp, 118 S.W. 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
17. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ward, 92 Fla. 526, 109 So. 452 (1926) (dictum) ; Sel-
den v. Cashman, 20 Cal. 57 (1862).
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the cause of action arose.' 8 The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action con-
ceded that reliance would otherwise have been a valid defense, but asserted
that it was inapplicable because the advising attorney was not a member of
the bar in the jurisdiction in which the prosecution had been instituted. The
court held that any competent, reputable attorney who has been admitted to
practice in any state in the Union is qualified to give advice on whether a
criminal warrant should be sought under the laws of another state. The court
apparently reasoned that because the advice of the "merest tyro in the pro-
fession" ' 9 is often accepted as a defense it would have been ludicrous to deny
the defense merely because the attorney was licensed in another state.
Courts have generally been insistent that an adviser be a bona fide member
of the bar. Where the person giving legal advice is clearly not an attorney and
the client is aware of this fact the defense is rejected; thus, the opinions of
police magistrates, probate judges, and justices of the peace have been disre-
garded.20 One decision indicates that the client's knowledge or good faith
belief is irrelevant. Thus, in an action to recover damages for malicious prose-
cution, reliance was held not a valid defense where the defendant had consulted
one who fraudulently held himself out as a duly licensed attorney.21 This
strict standard seems difficult to reconcile with the good faith theory which
underlies the defense. A better practice would be to inquire whether the lay-
man of average prudence should reasonably have believed the advisor to be a
18. Closgard Wardrobe Co. v. Normandy, 158 Va. 50, 163 S.E. 355 (1932).
19. Id. at 57, 163 S.E. at 358.
20. Sutton v. McConnell, 46 Wis. 269, 50 N.W. 414 (1879) (police magistrate) ; Ander-
son v. Fletcher, 228 Ill. App. 372 (1923) (judge of county court) ; James v. West, 67 Ohio
St. 28, 65 N.E. 156 (1902) (probate judge) ; Elwell v. Russel, 71 Conn. 462, 42 Atl. 862
(1899) (town clerk); Warth v. Hyman, 40 N.E.2d 849 (Ct. App. Ohio 1941) (clerk of
municipal court) ; Jones v. MacCanochie, 162 Pa. Sup. 124, 56 A.2d 284 (1948) (justice of
the peace) ; Mauldin v. Ball, 104 Tenn. 597, 58 S.W. 248 (1900) (justice of the peace) ;
Kumor v. Graham, 39 N.M. 245, 44 P.2d 722 (1935) (magistrate); Evans v. Michaelson,
146 Va. 64, 135 S.E. 683 (1926) (justice of the peace). But cf. Saunders v. Baldwin, 112
Va. 431, 71 S.E. 620 (1911) (conviction by justice of the peace conclusive evidence of
existence of probable cause in suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution). The
opinions of the officials are rejected as the basis for a defense because, while they may have
greater legal knowledge than a layman, rendering advice is not their function and they lack
the mantle of legal competence conferred upon members of the bar. See Kennedy v. Crouch,
191 Md. 580, 62 A.2d 582 (1948). See also Williams v. Confidential Credit Corp., 114 So.
2d 718, 720 (Ct. App. Fla. 1959) :
Although individual justices of the peace may have broad experience and knowledge
of the law, the courts may not conclusively presume that they are qualified to deter-
mine whether probable cause for an arrest exists. This is especially true in Florida
where such officers are not required to have legal training.
In a suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution, reliance by the defendant on the
advice of the prosecuting attorney may be accorded the same weight as the advice of a mem-
ber of the bar. See Gladfelter v. Doemel, 2 Wis. 2d 635, 87 N.W.2d 490 (1958) (dictum);
Smith v. Hensley, 107 Colo. 180, 109 P.2d 909 (1941) (dictum).
21. Murphy v. Larson, 77 Ill. 172 (1875).
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bona fide counselor-at-law. This would be compatible with the treatment of
disclosures made to a nonattorney. If the client in good faith believes that the
adviser is a member of the bar, disclosures made to him will be embraced in
the attorney-client privilege.2 This reasoning should also be relevant in situa-
tions where the attorney was, unknown to his client, temporarily or perma-
nently prohibited from the practice of law.
A more subjective, and hence less severe, standard is used to determine
whether the attorney relied on possessed the intelligence and ability of a skill-
ful member of the legal profession. A presumption of competence, based on
the attorney's status as a member of the bar, generally satisfies the defendant's
burden of going forward on this point.2 3 To rebut this presumption plaintiff
would have to introduce evidence of general ill-repute or specific acts of in-
competence known to the defendant at the time he received the advice. 24 Ar-
guably, this presumption of competence has been rendered less tenable by the
trend toward increasing specialization within the legal profession. Perhaps
an individual should not be justified in seeking advice with respect to a patent
problem from an attorney who he knows deals almost entirely with problems
involving domestic relations. On the other hand, it might still be reasonable
to assume that legal education gives practitioners sufficient familiarity with
legal materials to enable them to render a satisfactory opinion.
Intimately related to the issue of competency is the problem of interest. If an
attorney stands to realize appreciable personal benefits from the adoption of
a particular plan of action by his client, his interest may well influence his
opinion on that plan's legality.2 5 This problem arises frequently in the cor-
porate context. For example, if an option plan bestows stock of considerable
value upon the corporation's general counsel, directors may not be justified in
relying on his advice that the plan is lawful. But not every form of interest in
22. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2302 (3rd ed. 1940) ; People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277,
297, 27 N.W. 539 (1886) ; State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892).
23. See Home v. Sullivan, 83 Ill. 30, 32-33 (1876). See also It re Slater, 88 N.J. Eq.
296, 102 AtI. 384 (1917) ; Closgard Wardrobe Co. v. Normandy, 158 Va. 50, 163 S.E. 355
(1932) ; Gramling-Spalding Co. v. Parker, 3 Ala. App. 325, 57 So. 54 (1911) ; Estate of
Barbikas, 171 Cal. App. 2d 452, 341 P.2d 32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
24. See Flaks v. Clark, 143 Md. 377, 122 Atl. 383 (1923) ; In re Hayes, 40 Misc. 500, 82
N.Y. Supp. 792 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
25. See Adkin v. Pillen, 136 Mich. 682, 100 N.W. 176 (1904). It is generally considered
to be a jury question whether the attorney's interest was so substantial as to make the ad-
visee's reliance unjustified. L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Lumber Co., 121 Fed. 233
(5th Cir. 1903) ; Charles City Plow & Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 71 Iowa 234, 32 N.W. 280 (1887).
But see Union v. United Battery Service Co., 35 Ohio App. 68, 171 N.E. 608 (1929) ; Smith
v. Hensley, 107 Colo. 180, 109 P.2d 909 (1941) (decided advisee could not rely on advice
of her husband when their interests were identical) ; cf. Smith v. King, 62 Conn. 515, 26 At.
1059 (1893) (the court inferred from the advice itself that the attorney was biased).
In Emler v. Fox, 172 Ky. 469, 189 S.W. 469 (1916) it was held that political affiliation
alone was insufficient to disqualify the attorney's advice from constituting the basis of a
complete defense.
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the corporation's course of action will taint an attorney's advice. Courts have
allowed the defense in some cases where the corporation relied on the legal
advice of officers, directors, or stockholders.2 6 For example, in the Iowa case
Charles City Plow & Mfg. Co. v. Jones,27 Jones counterclaimed that the cor-
poration had wrongfully attached his property. The corporation sought to
defend this counterclaim by showing that it had relied on the advice of its
attorneys. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard evidence given in
support of the defense because the corporation's attorneys were stockholders
in the company and, in one instance, a corporate officer. The appellate court
remanded the case for a new trial on the ground that counsel were not neces-
sarily rendered incapable of giving accurate advice by their indirect pecuniary
interest in the result. The question of justifiable reliance in good faith was held
to be one for the jury.
Interest of the attorney would not seem to be relevant, however, when the
client is unaware of the fact. The only apparent reason for barring the defense
of reliance when the attorney is biased is the fact that a reasonable man would
not rely on such advice 2 -- the same reason that courts refuse to accept re-
liance on patently erroneous opinions. If the client, through no fault of his
own, is not alerted to the existence of some secret interest on the part of his
attorney, his reliance on advice received seems as reasonable as in any other
circumstances. The cases establishing the "interest" rule do not directly treat
this issue, for the attorney's interest was apparent in all. But at least two




Lay individuals in positions of trust and responsibility often encounter prob-
lems requiring the opinion of an attorney. Indeed, in such circumstances the
individual has the duty to consult a member of the bar, and he will be liable
for losses resulting from his failure to do so.30 When the layman seeks this
26. L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Lumber Co., 121 Fed. 233 (5th Cir. 1903) ;
Harvey-Watts Co. v. Worcester Umbrella Co., 193 Mass. 138, 78 N.E. 886 (1906) ; Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Ward, 92 Fla. 526, 109 So. 452 (1926) ; cf. Bailey v. Babcock, 241 Fed.
501 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
The courts appear to be of the opinion that a director's, officer's, or shareholder's identity
with the corporation is not absolute but depends on the degree of his financial commitment.
Where the advisor's interest is substantial, the courts do say that he is, in effect, advising
himself. See L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Lumber Co., supra.
27.. 71 Iowa 234,32 N.W. 280 (1887).
28. See White v. Carr, 71 Me. 555, 557 (1880) ("but when the attorney is directly inter-
ested in the subject matter of the suit, and his interest is known to the client, the client has no
right to presume that he will give him an unbiased opinion").
29. White v. Carr, sutpra note 28; Union v. United Battery Service Co., 35 Ohio App.
68, 171 N.E. 608 (1929).
30. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("This transaction...
was unusual; it was unique, yet there is nothing in the record to indicate that the advice of
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advice, and his attorney errs, the client is not held responsible for any en-
suing loss or liability. But this insulation is not absolute. To render the de-
fense applicable the advice must pertain to a question of law which is outside
the scope of the advisee's competence. 3' Delineation of those questions which
come within this rule will be attempted in the second section of this Comment,
which treats the several areas of law where this defense is frequently raised.
THE DEFENSE APPLIED
Trusts and Estates
A trustee, executor, or administrator stands in a fiduciary relationship to the
beneficiaries of a trust or estate, and in that position he is required to exercise
the degree of competence with which the average person of reasonable intelli-
gence and business acumen would manage his personal affairs.3 2 When that
standard of competence is not met and the trust suffers pecuniary damage as
a consequence, the trustee must assume the liability and undertake reimburse-
ment of the loss.33 Many of the functions which the trustee must perform and
the decisions which he must make revolve about questions of a legal nature.
Where the solution to a legal question is necessary, the due care standard
makes consultation with an attorney mandatory and, accordingly, the trustee
will be permitted to invoke the defense of reliance to protect himself from his
attorney's errors.3 4 The defense does not extend, however, to questions such as
the management of investments ;35 advice on the subject from a qualified in-
counsel was sought.") ; In re Demmerle's Executor, 130 Misc. 684, 691, 225 N.Y. Supp. 190,
198 (Surr. Ct. 1927) ; In re Wanamaker's Trust, 340 Pa. 419, 17 A.2d 380 (1941) ; Pearson
v. Gillenwaters, 99 Tenn. 446, 42 S.W. 9 (1897) ; Estate of Barbikas, 171 Cal. App. 2d 452,
341 P.2d 32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
31. For example, advice on a question of fact is not a defense. Williams v. Confidential
Credit Corp., 114 So.2d 718 (Ct. App. Fla. 1959). And if the advisee comitted an error of
judgment with respect to a transaction, advice that the transaction was lawful will be no
protection. See New Haven Trust Co. v. Doherty, 75 Conn. 555, 54 Atl. 209 (1903) ; Bailey
v. Babcock, 241 Fed. 501 (W.D. Pa. 1915) ; In re Westerfield, 32 App. Div. 324, 53 N.Y.
Supp. 25 (1898).
32. See Estate of Barbikas, 171 Cal. App. 2d 452, 341 P.2d 32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
In re Sharp's Estate, 61 N.J. Eq. 601, 606, 48 Atl. 327, 329 (Prerog. Ct. 1901) ; 2 Scorr,
TRUSTS §§ 174,204 (2d ed. 1956).
33. It re Belcher's Estate, 129 Misc. 218, 221 N.Y. Supp. 711 (Surr. Ct. 1927) ; James
v. West, 67 Ohio St. 28, 65 N.E. 156 (1902) ; see2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 205 (2d ed. 1956).
34. Estate of Barbikas, 171 Cal. App. 2d 452, 341 P.2d 92 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Pear-
son v. Gillenwaters, 99 Tenn. 446, 42 S.W. 9 (1897) ; In re Hazeltine's Estate, 182 AtI. 357
(1936) ; It re Sharp's Estate, 61 N.J. Eq. 601, 48 Atl. 327 (Prerog. Ct. 1901) ; In re Joost's
Estate, 50 Misc. 78, 100 N.Y. Supp. 378 (Surr. Ct. 1906) ; It re Demmerle's Executor, 130
Misc. 684,225 N.Y. Supp. 190 (Surr. Ct. 1927) ; Bradley's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 514 (1879).
35. In re Holbert, 48 Cal. 627 (1874) ; In re Belcher's Estate, 129 Misc. 218, 221 N.Y.
Supp. 711 (Surr. Ct. 1927) ; In re Pinchefski, 166 N.Y. Supp. 204 (App. Div. 1917) ; In re
Westerfield, 32 App. Div. 324, 53 N.Y. Supp. 25 (1898). But a trustee is not limited to ob-
taining advice; the attorney can perform such functions as the collection of claims, In re
Slater, 88 N.J. Eq. 296, 102 Atl. 388 (Prerog. Ct. 1917), and serving as escrow agent, Es-
tate of Barbikas, 171 Cal. App. 2d 452, 341 P.2d 32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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vestment counselor, however, has been held to furnish a defense of reliance
analogous to the advice of counsel plea.36
Trustees invoke the defense of reliance on counsel most frequently with re-
spect to investment of trust funds, 37 collection of debts due the trust,38 and
defense or initiation of suits on behalf of the trust.39 Where an attorney in-
correctly advises that a contemplated investment is lawful, courts must deter-
mine whether the investment was patently unauthorized or unlawful. If it was,
reliance will afford no protection. Thus, a trustee will not be relieved from
responsibility where an investment is made upon security below the standards
of quality established by statute,40 or where an investment inures to the
trustee's benefit.4 ' Of course, if the trustee fails to exercise proper business
judgment with respect to a lawful act, as where he allows funds to lay idle in
a savings account for an unreasonable length of time, he faces liability notwith-
standing the advice of counsel that the act itself was lawful.42 And the trustee
must be careful to ask the correct question. If he does not, reliance on the
answer to the question which he does ask may not serve as a defense. For
example, in one case the administratrix was surcharged by the referee for
failure to sell subscription rights to a new issue of corporate stock. The rights
were issued with respect to shares which had been owned by the decedent.
When the corporation issued the subscription rights, the administratrix's
attorney advised her that the law did not permit the estate to purchase addi-
tional stock of this nature. No inquiry was made as to whether the rights could
be sold. The court held that reliance on counsel's advice regarding the legality
of additional purchases did not relieve the administratrix of the duty to in-
vestigate the possibility of sale.
43
How to collect debts due the trust or estate is another question which
trustees frequently pass on to attorneys. This question involves more of an
element of legal tactics-weighing time, expense, and probable outcome of
36. In re Dodge's Estate, 39 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 845, 43
N.Y.S.2d 512 (1943). See generally 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 171.2 (2d ed. 1956).
37. E.g., In re Clark's Will, 136 Misc. 881, 242 N.Y. Supp. 210 (Surr. Ct. 1930), aff'd,
232 App. Div. 781, 249 N.Y. Supp. 923, rev'd, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931) ; Miller
v. Proctor, 20 Ohio St. 442 (1870) ; In re Whitecar's Estate, 147 Pa. 368,23 Atl. 575 (1892) ;
In re Kohler's Estate, 348 Pa. 55, 33 A.2d 920 (1943) ; In re Skinner's Estate, 215 Iowa 1021,
247 N.W. 484 (1933).
38. E.g., In re Slater, 88 N.J. Eq. 296, 102 Atl. 897 (Prerog. Ct. 1917) ; I re Joost's
Estate, 50 Misc. 78, 100 N.Y. Supp. 378 (Surr. Ct. 1906) ; Neff's Appeal, 57 Pa. 91 (1868).
39. E.g., In re Dammerle's Ex'r, 130 Misc. 684, 225 N.Y. Supp. 190 (Surr. Ct. 1927):
In re Wanamaker's Trust, 340 Pa. 419, 17 A.2d 380 (1941) ; Pearson v. Gillenwaters, 99
Tenn. 446,42 S.W. 9 (1897).
40. Miller v. Proctor, 20 Ohio St. 442 (1870) ; In re Westerfield, 32 App. Div. 324, 53
N.Y. Supp. 25 (1898).
41. In re Skinner's Estate, 215 Iowa 1021, 247 N.W. 484 (1933). See also James v.
West, 67 Ohio St. 28, 65 N.E. 156 (1902) (improper distribution from estate).
42. In re Whitecar's Estate, 147 Pa. 368, 23 Atl. 575 (1892).
43. In re Belcher's Estate, 129 Misc. 218, 221 N.Y. Supp. 711 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
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litigation-than does the determination of investment legality, but the require-
ments and results are the same. Failure to obtain and follow reasonable advice
will render the trustee personally liable for resulting losses.4 4 But where the
attorney renders an opinion, the trustee can rely on this advice even if the
attorney recommends a procedure other than suit on the debt. For example,
in Neff's Appeal 45 a beneficiary objected to acceptance of the trustee's ac-
counting because of the latter's failure to collect in full a note due the estate.
In lieu of suit, counsel had advised the procurement of insurance on the debt-
or's life. Although this course of action did not realize the full amount of the
debt, the trustee was held not surchargeable for the unpaid balance.
A trustee is not responsible for the incompetence or fraudulent acts of his
attorney unless the trustee did not exercise due care in retaining or continuing
to employ the lawyer.4 6 Where the testator's counsel has been retained to
manage the estate, the trustee will be partly relieved of the duty to investigate
the integrity of the attorney. "An executrix is not liable for secret stealings by
her attorney where no negligence on her part is established. And this is es-
pecially true where his honesty and responsibility are vouched for by [the]
testator." 47
Corporate Directors and Officers
The standard of due care to which corporate directors and officers must
adhere as fiduciaries is substantially the same as that imposed upon trustees,
administrators, and executors. 48 Thus, the situations in which reliance on the ad-
vice of counsel can be invoked as a defense are similar. Directors must consult
counsel on questions which require expert knowledge,49 but advice with re-
spect to legality will not protect them from liability or loss which is the result of
their own bad judgment 0 Where the directors follow their attorney's advice
with respect to collection of corporate claims, reliance may be invoked even if a
corporate director or officer benefits from the course of action adopted. The
defense has been allowed, for example, when directors have released the cor-
poration's president from putative liability to the company on the advice of
counsel that the claim was of doubtful validity.51 The defense has been allowed
44. See In re Sharp's Estate, 61 N.J. Eq. 601, 48 Atl. 327 (Prerog. Ct. 1901) (dictum);
Bradley's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 514 (1879) (dictum).
45. 57 Pa. 91 (1868). See also In re Joost's Estate, 50 Misc. 78, 100 N.Y. Supp. 378
(Surr. Ct. 1906) ; In rc Wanamaker's Trust, 340 Pa. 419, 17 A.2d 380 (1941).
46. In re Slater, 88 N.J. Eq. 296, 102 AtI. 897 (Prerog. Ct. 1917) ; In re Bender's Es-
tate, 278 Pa. 199, 122 At]. 283 (1923) ; In re Pinchefski, 179 App. Div. 578, 166 N.Y. Supp.
204 (1917) ; Estate of Barbikas, 171 Cal. App. 2d 452, 341 P.2d 32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
47. In re Bender's Estate, supra note 46, at 204, 122 Atl. at 284. (Emphasis added.)
48. See BALLANTINE, CoRpoRATioxs § 63 (1946) (citing cases).
49. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See also International Paper
Co. v. Gazette Co., 182 Mass. 578, 582, 66 N.E. 636, 637 (1903).
50. Bailey v. Babcock, 241 Fed. 501 (W.D. Pa. 1915); New Haven Trust Co. v. Do-
herty, 75 Conn. 555, 54 Atl. 209 (1903).
51. Holland v. Presley, 255 App. Div. 667, 8 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1939).
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even when the directors themselves benefit from the transaction. Spirt v.
Bechtel 5 2 involved a question relating to the income tax treatment of stock
options granted to key employees, including two directors. Under one ap-
proach, the recipients would have paid taxes on the options at ordinary income
tax rates, and the corporation would have taken a deduction for compensation
in computing its taxable income. The alternative treatment would have resulted
in substantial tax savings to the employees, but the corporation would have
lost the deduction for compensation. Counsel advised that the corporation had
no right to treat the options as compensation, and that the revenue laws per-
mitted only the treatment beneficial to the recipients. On the basis of this ad-
vice the directors voted to waive any rights the corporation might have had to
the deduction. Counsel's advice turned out to be erroneous. Plaintiff, a stock-
holder, brought a derivative suit to charge the directors for the lost tax sav-
ings, claiming that the alleged conflict of interest dictated the course of action
pursued. The court held that the directors were justified in relying on the
advice5 3 Judge Frank, dissenting, would have adopted a rule placing the risk
of erroneous advice on those who are advantageously affected by it, rather
than on the shareholders, who had no part in the decision.5
4
A few state statutes extend the defense of reliance to protect a director who
declares an illegal dividend in reliance on the representation of a corporate
financial officer.55 This situation generally arises where the corporation's books
of account erronously show the corporation's financial condition to be such
that a dividend could lawfully be declared. If the director relies in good faith
on these records, believing them to have been accurately prepared by the com-
pany's accountants, he is protected from liability. In the absence of such a
statute, one court has held directors liable for accountant's errors, on a strict
theory of agency.56 This more stringent approach seems unjustified, at least
where directors have relied on the results of an audit by a Certified Public
Accountant. The prerequisites for obtaining a license to practice as a Certified
Public Accountant are, in most states, quite strict,5 7 and would seem to endow
the accountant's opinions with as much reliability as those of a duly licensed
attorney.
52. 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956), Note, 66 YALE L.J. 611'(1957).
53. The court distinguished a remarkably similar case which had reached the opposite
result, Truncale v. Universal Pictures Inc., 76 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), solely on the
basis that "[T]here the defendants, who caused the corporation's consent to be filed with the
Commissioner, had not been advised by counsel that the corporation had no right to claim
a tax deduction on account of the options." 237 F.2d at 247,
54, Ibid.
55. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 64-605 (1957) ; CAL. CoRP. CODE § 829; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
172 (1953); NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.295 (1959); OHIo R~v. CODE ANN. § 1702.30 (Page,
1953) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-212 (1955).
56. Quintal v. Greenstein, 142 Misc. 854, 256 N.Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
57. Eact state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, have
statutes regulating the practice of public accounting. Every jurisdiction employs, in whole
or in part, the uniform CPA examination prepared by the American Institute of Certified
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Torts
Where all the elements of good faith reliance are established, advice of coun-
sel is a complete defense to an action to recover damages for malicious prosecu-
tion. To succeed in such an action the plaintiff must allege and prove the
malicious intent of the original complainant, and the lack of reasonable cause
for instituting the previous prosecution. Although reliance on the advice of
counsel will rebut either of these elements, the courts generally emphasize the
reasonable cause factor. 5 The requirement that the advising attorney be com-
petent is apparently liberally applied; all that need be shown is his status as a
duly licensed member of the bar. 9 Indeed, in one case the appellate court
chastised the trial judge for requiring the defendant to prove not only that his
adviser was an attorney but also that he was "learned and skilled in his pro-
fession." '0 But the requirement that the client must disclose all relevant in-
formation to the advising attorney is strictly adhered to, to guard against pos-
sible abuse of the defense through factual distortions calculated to result in
favorable legal advice.6 '
Public Accountants. STANDARDS OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE FOR CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS 31, 37 (University of Michigan 1956). Approximately 80% of all candidates
fail this test each time it is given. Id. at 95. Of those candidates with college and postgraduate
degrees, approximately 40% achieve passing grades. Id. at 58. All jurisdictions require that
a candidate for the examination be a high school graduate, and most will not license appli-
cants until they have had some kind of practical experience. A recent trend has been to
allow cross substitution of education and experience requirements. Id. at 31-34. These regu-
lations are generally administered by State Boards of Accountancy.
A certified public accountant's license to practice may be revoked for noncompliance with
standards of conduct established by statute or promulgated by state Boards of Accountancy.
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 5100; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 44 (1957) ; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 45:2-8 (1937); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7408; MICHIGAN STATE BOARD OF AC-
COUNTANCY, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1943) ; NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF PUB-
LIC ACCOUNTANTS, CODE OF ETHICS (1940) ; VERMONT BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1944).
For the rule relating to the advice of certified public accountants in tax matters, see note
88 infra.
58. See, e.g., Williams v. Confidential Credit Corp., 114 So.2d 718 (Ct. App. Fla. 1959);
Union v. United battery Service Co., 35 Ohio App. 68, 171 N.E. 608 (1929); Closgard
Wardrobe Co. v. Normandy, 158 Va. 50, 163 S.E. 355 (1932).
Infrequently, a complainant will seek the advice of an attorney, present to him fairly and
accurately all the relevant facts, but still be motivated solely by malice. In such a situation,
where the prosecution is instituted for reasons other than "the cause of public justice, the
fact that the defendant followed the advice of counsel is no defense." Kumor v. Graham, 39
N.M. 245, 724, 44 P.2d 722, 247 (1935) ; Evans v. Michaelson, 146 Va. 64, 135 S.E. 683
(1926) ; Gladfelter v. Deemel, 2 Wis. 2d 635, 87 N.W.2d 490 (1958).
59. See cases cited note 23 supra. With respect to the use as a defense of reliance on the
advice of nonlawyers, see notes 20-21 supra.
60. Home v. Sullivan, 83 Ill. 30,32 (1876).
61. See Seaboard Oil Co. v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1931) ; Smith v. Hen-
sley, 107 Colo. 180, 109 P.2d 909 (1941) ; Kitchen v. Rosenfeld, 44 R.I. 399, 117 Atl. 537
(1922) ; Smith v. King, 62 Conn. 515, 26 Atl. 1059 (1893) ; cf. Emler v. Fox, 172 Ky. 469,
189 S.W. 469 (1916) ; Adkin v. Pillen, 136 Mich. 682, 100 N.W. 176 (1904).
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Similarly, reliance on counsel's advice may also be a complete defense to
other actions in tort where a necessary element is the existence of negligence,
or malicious or fraudulent intent.62 For example, in Lane v. Fenn 03 a com-
mon stock prospectus contained the erroneous information that the issuing
corporation held a franchise to construct a telephone system in New York
City. Plaintiff purchased stock in reliance on the prospectus and, when his
shares became worthless, brought suit against the corporation's directors to
recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentations. Because the directors had
relied upon the advice of competent counsel to the effect that the franchise was
valid, the court held that the absence of bad faith or fraudulent intent defeated
the plaintiff's cause of action. The court noted, however, that the defense of
reliance would not have been a bar to an action for rescission and restitution
on the ground of mutual mistake, which does not require any showing of
intent.
64
In actions for trespass, wrongful attachment, and wrongful conversion, re-
liance is only a partial defense. Actual damages will be awarded upon a finding
that the defendant committed the acts alleged, regardless of any advice he
may have received. But a defendant can avoid the imposition of punitive
damages by showing that he relied upon the advice of reputable counsel that
he had a valid claim to the property attached, converted, or trespassed upon.
United States v. Homestake Mining Co. 66 was an action to recover damages
for conversion of timber on a federal forest reserve. The defendant's attorney
had previously made an agreement with the Secretary of the Interior permit-
62. See Nelson v. J. H. Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N.E. 180 (1909) (action to
recover damages for trademark infringement) ; Ashland Auto Sales v. Stock, 217 Ky. 594,
290 S.W. 487 (1927) (action to recover double rent for unlawful holding over on a lease) ;
Elwell v. Russel, 71 Conn. 662, 42 Atl. 862 (1899) (action to recover damages for misrepre-
sentation as to ownership of land) ; Douglas v. United States Fid. & Cas. Co., 81 N.H. 371,
127 Atl. 708 (1924) (action to recover damages against, insurance company for negligently
failing to settle a claim against insured) ; Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So.
372 (1931) (action for cancellation of lease for willful failure to pay full rent).
63. 65 Misc. 336, 120 N.Y. Supp. 237 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
64. Id. at 341, 120 N.Y. Supp. at 241. Similarly, the erroneous advice of counsel is not
a valid ground for reformation of a written contract. Edythe Nelson, Inc. v. 500 Fifth
Avenue, Inc., 73 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Sol Apfel, Inc. v. Kocher, 61 N.Y.S.2d 508
(Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Halbe v. Adams, 163 N.Y. Supp. 895 (App Div. 1917).
65. United States v. St. Anthony R.R., 192 U.S. 524, 542-43 (1904); Scalise v. National
Util. Serv., Inc., 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Conn. v. Rice, 204 Fed. 181, 191 (5th Cir.
1913) ; United States v. Midway No. Oil Co., 232 Fed. 619, 632-34 (S.D. Cal. 1916) ; United
States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663 (D. Mont. 1902) ; Kirby v. First Nat'l Bank, 64
-S.D. 404, 266 N.W. 883, 884-85 (1936) ; Abbott v. 76 Land & Water Co., 103 Cal. 607, 37
Pac. 527 (1894) ; Union Mill Co. v. Prenzler, 100 Iowa 540, 69 N.W. 876 (1897) ; Charles
City Plow & Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 71 Iowa 234, 32 N.W. 280 (1887) ; Gramlin-Spalding Co.
v. Parker, 2 Ala. App. 403, 57 So. 54 (1911) ; Selden v. Cashman, 20 Cal. 57 (1862) ; Mills
v. Vollmer-Clearwater Co., 126 Wash. 73, 217 Pac. 3 (1923) ; Rainey v. Kemp, 118 S.W.
630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
66. 117 Fed. 481 (8th Cir. 1902).
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ting the corporation to cut timber for use in its mines. The government alleged
that the Secretary had no authority to make such an agreement and sought
to recover damages for willful conversion. The court conceded that every man
is presumed to know the law but distinguished between those who willfully
and those who inadvertently violate it:
The error in his advice... was not so plain that a layman could be fairly
charged with knowledge of its existence, and the fact that the defendant
committed this trespass under the advice of reputable counsel that it was
acting within its legal rights goes far to establish its good faith, and to
dispute the claim of the government that it ever intended or was attempt-
ing to secure an unconscientous advantage by cutting and using the tim-
ber.67
Crimes
Reliance on advice of counsel as a defense has been restricted to offenses
which are the criminal counterparts of the civil action of conversion, such as
larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining money under false pretenses.", Courts
in these cases apparently feel that if there is a reasonable doubt as to the own-
ership of property, criminal conviction of a party advised by counsel that he
may assert his rights would serve no purpose. Any party injured by the wrong-
ful taking is adequately protected by civil remedies. Reliance does not consti-
tute a defense to other crimes, and attempts to interpose it have been made
and rejected in cases involving bigamy, 69 adultery,70 obstruction of public
roads, 71 and sale of goods without a valid license.
72
Arguably, criminal statutes which provide that violations must have been
committed "knowingly" or "willfully" would allow a defense of reliance on
advice that the act was not illegal. But the tendency of the courts has been to
construe such statutes otherwise.7 In People v. McCalla,74 for example, the
defendant was charged with knowingly selling securities without a permit from
the Corporation Commissioner, a criminal violation of the California Corpor-
67. Id. at 488.
68. See People v. Schultz, 71 Mich. 315, 38 N.W. 868 (1888); Buchanan v. State, 5 So.
617 (1889) ; People v. Sheasby, 255 Pac. 837 (1927) ; State v. Oppenheimer, 41 Wash. 618,
84 Pac. 588 (1906) ; State v. Patterson, 66 Kan. 447, 71 Pac. 860 (1903) ; State v. Hunt, 25
R.I. 75, 54 Atl. 937 (1903) ; cf. People v. Long, 50 Mich. 249, 15 N.W. 105 (1883).
69. Staleyv. State, 89 Neb. 701, 131 N.W. 1028 (1911).
70. State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30 (1876).
71. Ward v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 435,60 S.W. 757 (1901).
72. State v. Foster, 22 LI. 1631, 46 Atl. 833 (1900). See also United States v. An-
thony, 24 Fed. Cas. 829 (No. 14459) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (unlawful voting).
73. See Licavoli v. United States, No. 15764, D.C. Cir. Feb. 16,.1961; People -v. Mar-
cus, 261 N.Y. 268, 185 N.E. 97 (1933) ; Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1122-23
(1940) ("In our opinion, a 'willful' act.. . does not mean that the registrant must be aware
of the fact that he is violating the law; he may willfully violate the law even though he is
completely ignorant of the legal consequences of his act.") But cf. Williamson v. United
States, 207 U.S. 425, 453 (1908).
74. 63 Cal. App. 783,220 Pac. 436 (1923).
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ate Securities Act.75 The court rejected as irrelevant the defendant's offer to
'prove that he had relied in good faith upon counsel's advice that the instru-
ments sold were not "securities" within the meaning of the Act. The court
construed the term "knowingly" to mean with knowledge of the essential facts
forming the basis of the violation, and declared that "from such knowledge of
the facts the law presumes a knowledge of the legal consequences." 76
Contempt of Court
As a general rule, reliance on the erroneous advice of competent counsel
will not relieve an individual of his responsibility for acting in accordance with
court orders, and will not enable him to escape conviction and punishment
for contempt if he disregards the orders.77 The contempt of court citation
serves a dual function. The contemnor must be punished for flouting the
court's order, and the dignity and authority of the court must be vindicated
in the eyes of the public.7 8 Because conviction alone fulfills the latter function,
however, courts will often take good faith reliance into consideration in mitiga-
tion of the penalty imposed.79 The most common type of error by attorneys is
misinterpretation of the court's order. Courts appear to give more weight to
the fact of reliance where the order is confusing or ambiguous than where the
acts committed were obviously prohibited.80
Bankruptcy
In bankruptcy proceedings reliance on erroneous legal advice is frequently
offered to counter an allegation of fraudulent concealment of assets. The de-
fense may be successful if a genuine doubt exists regarding a bankrupt's in-
75. Now CAL. CORP. CODE § 25500.
76. 63 Cal. App. at 793-95, 220 Pac. at 440-41. The court explained, "for the effective
protection of the public, the burden is placed upon the individual to ascertain at his peril
whether his act is prohibited by the statute." Ibid.
77. See, e.g., In re La Varre, 48 F.2d 216 (S.D. Ga. 1930) ; Evans v. International Typo-
graphical Union, 81 F. Supp. 675, 688 (S.D. Ind. 1948) ; Weston v. John L. Roper Lumber
Co., 158 N.C. 270, 73 S.E. 799 (1912) ; State ex rel. 0. Hommel Co. v. Fink, 111 W. Va.
334, 161 S.E. 557 (1931) ; Carr v. District Court, 147 Iowa 663, 126 N.W. 791 (1910) ; In
re Henn, 113 N.J. Eq. 155, 166 Atl. 138 (Ch. 1933); Folsom v. State, 216 Ark. 31, 224
S.W.2d 44 (1949) ; Licavoli v. United States, No. 15764, D.C. Cir., Feb. 16, 1961 (Congres-
sional subpoena). Contra, Dinsmore v. Louisville, N.A. & C.R.R., 3 Fed. 593 (D. Ind. 1880);
Furrer v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 109 Neb. 1, 189 N.W. 295 (1922).
78. See, e.g., Folsom v. State, 216 Ark. 31, 224 S.W.2d 44 (1949).,
79. Queen & Co. v. Green, 170 Fed. 611 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1909) ; Ulman v. Ritter, 72 Fed.
1000 (C.C.D.W. Va. 1896) ; Coffin v. Burstein, 68 App. Div. 22, 74 N.Y. Supp. 274 (1902) ;
Rumney v. Donovan, 28 Mont. 69, 72 Pac. 305 (1903) ; Folsom v. State, 216 Ark. 31, 224
S.W.2d 44 (1949).
80. See Queen & Co. v. Green, supra note 79; Dinsmore v. Louisville, N.A. & C.R.R., 3
Fed. 593 (D. Ind. 1880) ; Folsom v. State, 216 Ark. 31, 224 S.W.2d 44 (1949) ; Rumney v.
Donovan, supra note 79; Furrer v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 109 Neb. 1, 189 N.W. 295
(1922).
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terest in a particular asset, and if his attorney advises that the property need
not be included in his schedule of assets. The bankrupt's good faith reliance
will prevent the denial of his discharge. But because the rights of innocent
creditors are at stake and, perhaps, because the statutory grant of a discharge
has been construed as a privilege, courts in these cases have been particularly
strict in insisting upon full disclosure of information to counsel and in disre-
garding reliance on patently erroneous advice.8 '
Taxation
The Internal Revenue Code imposes civil penalties on individual and cor-
porate taxpayers for the commission of a variety of errors in the computation
of their tax liability, including failure to file the proper tax or information re-
turns,8 2 failure to pay current or estimated taxes,8 3 and failure to make re-
quired deposits of taxes.8 4 Where these errors are committed willfully or with
fraudulent intent, criminal penalties may also be imposed.8 5 Reliance may be
a bar to the imposition of civil penalties because this proof of good faith negates
the existence of willfulness or fraudulent intent. Thus, in Davis v. Commis-
sioner,8s the taxpayers were assessed a penalty equal to fifty per cent of their
tax deficiency, on the allegation that the deficiency was due to fraud with in-
tent to evade taxes. The taxpayers were neither highly educated nor familiar
with tax laws, and their returns were prepared by a tax expert to whom they
furnished all their books and records. Upon these facts the court found insuf-
ficient proof of fraud. Under some sections, civil penalties are assessed "unless
it is shown that such failure [to file returns] is due to reasonable cause and
81. In re Merritt, 28 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1928) ; In re Breitling, 133 Fed. 146 (7th Cir.
1904) ; In re Soroko, 34 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ; In re Perel, 51 F.2d 506 (S.D. Tex.
1931) ; Inre Russell, 52 F.2d 749 (D.N.H. 1931).
Prior to its amendment in 1938, § 14 of the Bankruptcy Act, 44 Stat. 663 (1926)
(amended by 52 Stat. 850 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1958)), provided that within twelve
court, in its discretion, could extend the time for filing by six months "if it shall be made to
appear ... that the bankrupt was unavoidably prevented from filing it within such time .... "
In some cases the bankrupt sought to show that his failure to petition for discharge within
the prescribed period was the fault of his lawyer. In the majority of cases the courts held
that the inadvertence or negligence of the bankrupt's attorney was insufficient reason for
allowing the exception. In re Schaefer, 80 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1935) ; In re Taylor, 22 F.2d
499 (2d Cir. 1927) ; It re Berghorst, 24 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Mich. 1938) ; In re Adams,
12 F. Supp. 755 (D. Mont. 1933). See also In re Balzer, 12 F.2d 94 (S.D. Cal. 1926). Contra,
In re Swain, 243 Fed. 781 (D. Mass. 1917) ; Cohen v. Keller, 108 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1940) ;
In re Powers, 42 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1941) ; In re Ewing, 8 F, Supp. 285 (DN.J. 1934).
82. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6651, 6652.
83. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6653, 6654, 6655.
84. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6656.
85. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7201-07.
86. 184 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1950).
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not due to willful neglect .... ,, 87 The courts have uniformly held that re-
liance on the advice of an attorney or accountant constitutes reasonable cause
for the failure to file.
88
Recognition of the defense in cases involving tax offenses is compelled by
the mechanics of our taxing system. Individuals are obliged to be their own
personal tax assessors and to apply the intricacies of a highly complex statute
to their finances. Since compliance with this duty often necessitates turning the
matter over to an expert, it would be unreasonable to punish the taxpayer
when this effort to comply goes awry.
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6651 (personal holding companies).
88. The defense appears most frequently in cases involving personal holding company re-
turns. See Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Hay-
wood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Orient Inv. &
Fin. Co. v Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Hatfried Inc. v. Commissioner, 162
F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Walnut St. Co. v. Glenn, 83 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Ky. 1948) ; cf.
Tarbox Corp., 6 T.C. 35 (1946).
For the use of this defense under similar provisions, see, e.g., It re Fiske's Estate, 203
F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Spouting Rock Beach Corp. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 938,
943 (D.R.I. 1959) ; C. R. Lindback Foundation, 4 T.C. 652, 667 (1945) ; E. M. Green, 11
B.T.A. 278 (1928) (dictum). See also Dayton Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan, 281 Fed.
709 (6th Cir. 1922) (assessment of penalty for failure to file special tax return required by
Munitions Act).
In most of the above cases, the advice relied upon was that of a certified public accountant,
whose advice in tax matters stands on an equal footing with that of an attorney. The advice
of a noncertified accountant will not suffice. Tarbox Corp., 6 T.C. 35 (1946). This is because
only Certified Public Accountants are permitted to practice before the Treasury in tax mat-
ters. "To accord the status of 'experts' . . . to accountants for representation purposes and
then to hold that taxpayers who entrust to them the task of preparing their returns run the
risk of paying heavy penalties should they err in the discharge of their assignment creates an
absurd situation." Hatfried Inc. v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1947).
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